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the desert. Strange indeed, but strong as strange,—for what are M. Fromentin's last words?

“The thirst one suffers from is beyond all words. Ever the same, ever unbearable. . . . I think even to madness of a glassful of pure cold water. My whole being is transformed into the one raging appetite for drink. Yet no matter! there is in this land a something incomparable, that obliges one to love it. I think with horror that I must turn northwards; and on the day when I shall pass out by the door of the east never to return, I shall bitterly look back towards this wonderful place, and shall with deep, regretful longing salute the menacing horizon that bounds the desolate waste so justly named the Land of Thirst.”

ART. X.—*The Biographical History of Philosophy, from its Origin in Greece down to the Present Day.* By GEORGE HENRY LEWES. Library Edition, much enlarged and thoroughly revised, in two volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1857.

THE study of the history of philosophy, when pursued by means of abstracts and generalizations, must, from the nature of things, be to a certain degree unsatisfactory. Philosophers are in general close writers, as well as close thinkers. A thinker who has spent years in elaborating a system, and at last publishes it to the world, free from those rounded proportions and that outside adornment which swell the bulk of works designed to attract and to gratify the unthinking crowd, does not ordinarily say in a volume what may be as well said in a few pages. What abstract, for instance, can do any justice to the chain of reasoning by which Kant binds the soaring spirit of man within the darkness of his scepticism, in seemingly hopeless imprisonment, until he himself leads him forth again into the free air and sunshine? And if this difficulty is experienced in regard to a merely critical philosophy, it is felt even more strongly in those that are constructive. A mere generalization is most unsubstantial fare. We

need to see the slow process by which it attains its growth, and absorbs all things into its own nature. We can scarcely read an original work of this class, however much we may dissent from the final result at which it arrives, without gaining a new insight into the nature and connection of things.

The difficulty of obtaining a knowledge of such works by mere abstracts is of course more felt in regard to the comparatively later than to the earliest philosophers, partly on account of the greater simplicity of the earlier systems, partly because in regard to them the whole world suffers together. By a glance at one of these we can perhaps better understand the difficulty of which we speak. We will take as an example Thales. All that can be said of him is, that he asserted that the principle of all things is water. Nothing can seem more absurd, at the first glance, than this assertion, made thus boldly. This solid earth, the green trees, our own frames, seem by their very presence to belie it. Yet, if we should consider, in detail, all the facts by which it might be supported, and should compare these with the all-embracing generalizations of the Neptunian theory in modern geology, we should admire the broad grasp of the reason of Thales, rather than ridicule his simplicity. But this single sentence, which we have quoted from him, bears a much greater proportional relation to the speculations and observations to which we have referred, than do the abstracts of the systems of later philosophers, given in the common histories, to the systems themselves; and the difficulty in the former case is so much less considerable, as the connection of the thoughts in the latter is more concealed and intricate. The matter is made worse by the fact that historians in general attempt to give an abstract of the reasonings of a philosopher, instead of their result. What we want is what the Germans call his *Weltanschauung*. The historian should have imagination enough to place himself upon the stand-point of the philosopher he would describe, and, instead of leading his reader among skeletons of arguments, and ghosts of ideas, and huge systems of terminology, which are to him almost as bare of meaning as they will ever be useless for application, he should construct the world as beheld from this position. This, if it

were skilfully done, as in many cases it might be, would at once interest and instruct the reader; and if afterward he might wish to climb the height and see for himself, there could be no better course suggested to him than the intricate labyrinth which the author of the system has followed out, and of which he alone can furnish the clew.

We know not whether the histories of philosophy, that succeed one another so rapidly, do not owe their existence as much to the lack of satisfaction that is felt in this study, as to any other cause. Men have a desire to look into these philosophic mysteries. Each work that promises to aid them in this fails either to interest or to instruct them as they wish, and thus they demand ever new manuals. The work whose title is placed at the head of this article can less than any other, perhaps, be accused of dulness. The writer is lively and pleasant. Where others would put their readers to sleep, he amuses them, so far as the subject will admit, with his vivid fancy. This pleasantness, however, is in part owing unfortunately to a certain flippancy, which would be less objectionable were it merely on the surface. It seems, however, to extend into the thought, or rather to spring from it. Thus the philosopher, whose deep and intricate reasoning would almost appall any other writer who found himself forced to communicate an idea of it in brief, and who might perhaps only bewilder the reader by his attempts, causes no difficulty to Mr. Lewes. He turns him at once into a harlequin, and leads him forth to amuse the crowd by a sort of ground and lofty tumbling. This exhibition is greeted by laughter, instead of yawns, and doubtless the exhibitor congratulates himself on his success.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Lewes had not selected a field in which his peculiar talents would have been more appropriate. In works merely scientific, if he had wished, and had turned his studies in that direction, he might have done something to enlighten the popular mind. In studies relating to the literature and the thought of France he might have made himself especially at home. But, unluckily, he has devoted himself to labors to which his irreverent and superficial habits of thought are especially unfitted, namely, philosophy and German literature.

We are glad to see that the new edition of his *History of Philosophy* is less marked by that flippant conceit of which we have spoken, than the first. While he still boasts that he is the only person who ever undertook to write a history of philosophy without having any faith in the possibility of philosophy, he no longer claims this as the only proper stand-point for undertaking such a work. While he still does not hesitate to attempt an analysis of the system of Hegel, he does not claim any longer the peculiar honor of being the only person who has undertaken to show how it grew up in the mind of its author, and this without understanding its first principles. While the work is thus improved in some respects, it has not, we regret to say, gained to a corresponding extent in depth and insight. The distinction between science and philosophy was much more correctly stated in the earlier edition than in the present.

The author starts, as has been intimated, from the principle that a true philosophy is impossible. We certainly have no fault to find with this position. It is the one more commonly held by the world, and a writer occupying it is to be respected for the respectability of his constituency, if for no other reason. It is also the view most naturally taken by one who looks at things merely from without, whether in philosophy or religion. He sees sects and parties that appear in direct opposition to one another. Each claims to hold the truth. If either is right, it would seem to imply that all the others are wrong. The simplest way, then, is to affirm that all are wrong. Not till one has reached the central idea in either case, and seen how all grow out of it, and serve for the development of it, can this position be opposed with any show of reason. A candid expression of opinion is to be welcomed from all parties, especially when supported by sound argument and learning. If Mr. Lewes occupied simply this position, his work should be hailed as the first formal representative of it. If his position were controverted, it would be simply a free and honorable discussion. But when a writer, instead of merely announcing his lack of faith in that philosophy of which he is to give the history, starts with the most imperfect and fluctuating notion of what that phi-

losophy actually is ; when he fails to perceive in their truth those distinctions which meet him at the very threshold ; when he shows himself unable to grasp the thought of some of the most important writers of whom he treats ; when he evinces a disposition to hold up as ridiculous what he cannot understand ; when he thus ridicules works which he has never read save in part, and this part only carelessly ; and when he supports this ridicule by gross mistranslation, — the case is changed. Such is the position which we charge Mr. Lewes with occupying, which charge it will be the principal object of the following pages to maintain.

It is first to be inquired, What idea does Mr. Lewes attach to the word *philosophy*? He acknowledges the propriety of this question, and informs us that he wishes to attach to it the same meaning which it bears in all other histories. He therefore defines it as *metaphysics*, in opposition to science. He subsequently includes psychology under the same head, where it properly belongs, and intimates that in that study some real progress has been made. On the same page he writes : “ Vainly do some argue that Philosophy has made no progress hitherto, because its problems are so complex, and require more effort than *the simpler problems of Science*.” (p. xii.) Here it is distinctly intimated that the problems of philosophy are essentially different from those of science. On a subsequent page we read as follows : “ The heights and depths of man’s nature, the heights to which he aspires, the depths into which he searches, and the grander generalities on Life, Destiny, and the Universe, find as eminent a place in Science as in Philosophy, with the simple difference, that they are less vague and are better founded.” (p. xiv.) All questions relating to God and the soul belong certainly to metaphysics. The moment we approach such subjects, we leave the domain of science, as Mr. Lewes defines it. He himself says : “ To aspire to the knowledge of more than phenomena, — their resemblances, coexistences, and successions, — is to aspire to transcend the inexorable limits of human faculty.” (p. xii.) God is certainly not a phenomenon ; yet a knowledge of him is certainly the highest to which man aspires, and therefore must be included in the splendid promise quoted above.

Mr. Lewes's remonstrance, when a thought of this seems to cross his mind, reminds us of the reply that Mephistopheles made to Faust's first demand, after he had pledged himself to satisfy all his wants. Mr. Lewes writes, a few lines below those last quoted: "If we cannot reach certain heights, let us acknowledge them to be inaccessible, and not deceive ourselves and others by phrases which pretend that these heights are accessible."

In relation to science and philosophy Mr. Lewes writes: "The object of both is the same, namely, Explanation of all phenomena. Their characteristic differences, therefore, do not lie in the thing sought, so much as in the Method of search." (p. xv.) This view he admits to be different from that maintained in his first edition. He goes on to illustrate this alleged distinction by a twofold attempt to explain the phenomena of table-tipping; the metaphysical method being to assign some fanciful cause, without supporting its position by proof; while the scientific method subjects everything to careful experiment.

We have thus collected scattered remarks of Mr. Lewes, which may serve to illustrate his view of the distinction between science and philosophy. Let us look back upon them, and see what we have obtained. In the earlier quotations he intimates distinctly that their problems are of a different nature. On page xiv. he asserts them to be the same; which assertion is quickly withdrawn, as soon as it is seen to lead to undesirable consequences. In the passage last cited, he again affirms them to be the same, and this time holds his position. It is certainly a safer one for science than the one which he relinquished; for in that he had raised science to the heights of philosophic thought; while in this he brings down philosophy to the objects of scientific inquiry. He has before rightly stated that psychology is a part of metaphysics, and had admitted that the study of it had been pursued, at least in part, in the scientific method, to which it had been indebted for its progress. Now we read that science and philosophy differ only in their method. To which field, therefore, does psychology belong? We have already said that Mr. Lewes began his History with an imperfect and fluctuating

notion of what philosophy actually is. We think that the statement has been proved true.

Before leaving this part of the subject, we will refer to a method by which we might seem at first glance able to unite the two meanings which we have charged Mr. Lewes with giving to the word philosophy. Mr. Lewes himself suggests this (p. xxx.), though not apparently observing that such a reconciliation is needed. Philosophy has both a peculiar aim and a peculiar method. The latter of these is the most fundamental. Its object differs from that of science, because its method is different. Science, having adopted the experimental method, rejects all such objects of inquiry as cannot be reached by this; philosophy retains the intuitional method, and applies it to all objects, both to those which are included in the circle of science, and to those which have been rejected by science. Mr. Lewes is therefore right in speaking of the peculiar aims of philosophy, and at the same time in affirming that its fundamental difference is in its method. At least he is consistent with himself. A review of the points that have been stated will show, however, that this defence will not hold good. He defines philosophy as metaphysics. This is no loose and popular definition; for he states in his Preface that he is now writing for scholars, having been surprised at the reception which his first edition had received from them. His use of the term metaphysics must be the ordinary one, or he would not have used it in this unrestricted manner. The meaning of the word as given by Worcester is, "The science of the mind; ontology." This definition is sustained by the analysis of the word itself. Mr. Lewes retains psychology under this head, and admits that it has been pursued in the scientific method. Either this is false, or else psychology is a branch of science, and not of metaphysics. He asserts that the assignment of electricity as the cause of table-tipping belongs to metaphysics. Yet we think that either he, or any one else, would be puzzled to tell what this has to do with "the science of the mind," or with "ontology."

We ask the reader's pardon for this repetition. We felt it our duty to give Mr. Lewes the best defence in our power

against the charges we had just made ; and no less, to show that these charges are not invalidated by our defence. This is not a mere question of words. It makes very little difference in what sense a man uses them, provided he make that sense clear, and stand to it. But when a writer undertakes to give an entirely new view of any subject, the first question is, not whether it be the right view, but whether it be any clear view at all. If he undertakes to treat of subjects which require the most subtle discrimination, it is worthy of notice if, in the very first question that arises, one indeed which he himself has started, he becomes confused, contradicts himself, and leaves no decided conception in the mind of the reader except that of his own want of any. If one should employ a guide, who had promised to lead him to the place whither he would go, by a new and safe route known only to himself, it would make some difference whether, on starting, he should first turn to the east, and then to the west, uncertain which direction to take. It would at least show his own incapacity for the business before him.

To illustrate more fully the imperfection of his notion of what philosophy is, let us examine a little more closely that into which he settles down at last. It is the explanation of phenomena, — such phenomena as table-tipping. He selects this example as one particularly appropriate, because the scientific explanation is fully established ; yet what he calls the metaphysical explanation has been so recently maintained, and, he might have added, is still so generally maintained, that the reader can enter into the spirit of it without difficulty. What he assumes as the metaphysical explanation consists in this, — “that it is an hypothesis started, and taken for granted without being proved by experiment.” The theory which is based on the interference of disembodied spirits, and that which assumes the phenomena in question to be caused by electricity, are alike brought under the head of metaphysical. What he calls the scientific explanation is, that the movements in question are produced by involuntary muscular action. It is called scientific, because it is based upon careful experiment. Mr. Lewes, as we have before seen, expresses the same anxiety to use the word philosophy, in the

sense in which it is used in other histories, as M. Jourdain in the play of Molière did to dress and to conduct in all respects like the quality; and he is about as successful. We think he would find no history of philosophy in which the term is thus used, namely, to designate the explanation of particular phenomena by finite causes. If science has any realm, it is precisely this. If the causes are assumed too freely, and without proper investigation, they do not on this account belong to philosophy or metaphysics. They constitute imperfect science. Or rather they bear the same relation to science, which the dreams of some wild enthusiast do to philosophy. They may be counterfeits; but whatever they are, it is science that must suffer from them. Philosophy has to do with far different subjects. The objects of its study are God, spirit, freedom, the world as an organic whole. These it does not take singly, but in their relations to one another. The form under which it contemplates them is that of necessity. It is not at variance with science, but it uses its results freely, and absorbs them into itself. If it has anything to do with particular phenomena, it is when it can regard them as the results of the absolute world-system. Then, and then only, does it assume the function which Mr. Lewes ascribes to it, namely, the explanation of phenomena. This is a distinction which he cannot appreciate. He compares the certainty with which the philosopher speaks of the objects such as have been referred to, which are visible only to the intuition of reason, with the confidence with which some dreamer might speak of his conceptions of the nature of the inhabitants of Sirius. He does not comprehend that the one speaks of that which forms the groundwork of his own being, and which the eye turned inward, if not already blinded by the glitter of the outward world, could hardly fail to discern; and the other, of the outward peculiarities of beings most unlike himself. We have referred to this subject, not to give a definition of philosophy, but to illustrate the sense in which, with only minor differences, it is used in the works which Mr. Lewes would imitate, and to show by contrast the difference between this and the meaning which Mr. Lewes assigns to it.

Mr. Lewes's last definition of philosophy, or metaphysics,

for he uses the terms as synonymous, is well fitted to support him in the assertion, that the course of science is always onward, while that of philosophy is circular. All explanations of phenomena which are not thoroughly proved, he calls metaphysical. Any such explanation which turns out to be false cannot have been thoroughly verified; therefore, as soon as any scientific assertion is at last seen to be ungrounded, it at once passes from the realm of science into that of philosophy. Thus philosophy is burdened, not only with its own blunders, but with those of science also; and science is as infallible as the Pope. This is the only view by which the infallibility of science can be maintained. Take, for instance, the various positions of science in regard to light. First, we have the corpuscular theory; but shortly the existence of light corpuscles is denied, light is affirmed to be an ether pervading the universe, and the effect of light is produced by the undulation of this ether. At present, by the bold generalizations in regard to the correlation of forces, science seems on the point of ignoring even ether. The same is true in regard to electricity. The existence of the electrical fluid seemed established, if anything was; but now doubt is thrown even over this. Light and electricity, heat and magnetism, seem about to lose their existence as distinct entities, and to be brought together as mere modifications of one pervading force. This example, in which doubt is seen to be cast by science itself on what is still generally regarded as established by science, may serve as an example to offset Mr. Lewes's table-turning, which occupies the same intermediate position between that which is proved and that which is still doubtful. It may be said that the changes in science result in general from the progress from a narrower to a broader generalization, as its circle of facts becomes enlarged. But the same is true of philosophy; only its progress is more regular, being from within outward, and not the result of accretion. Thus Anaxagoras united the tendencies of the previous philosophies into his system; Plato again summed up those of the philosophers that had gone before him; and Hegel adopts all with more minuteness as moments into his own system. That absolute identity which formed the basis of the utterance of

Thales, and which was more clearly stated by the Eleatics, forms also the basis of the latest system. Principles which seem most opposed to one another, such as the absolute identity of Spinoza, and the absolute diversity of Leibnitz, both find themselves adopted into a higher generalization, where their hostility is lost. Thus the same questions continually reappear, as Mr. Lewes has stated; but it is as the cotyledons of the seeds of a plant reappear in the young leaves, the structure of the leaves in the flower, the divisions of the flower in the fruit. Thus the line of progress is not a circle, but a spiral.

For this progress the negative element is necessary. Thought is infinite; but particular systems are finite. As the body must die, that the spirit may attain to its highest development, so systems must perish, that the thought may pass on to higher spheres. And as the Church has taught that these bodies shall not be left for ever, but shall be raised, and glorified, and enter with the spirit into its purer state of being; so is it with these systems which have been cast aside,—the absolute thought still bears them with it, freed from their grossness and finiteness, as it presses onward in its free development. There must therefore be the element of negation, which shall do for them what death does for the body. Such are the periods of scepticism, through one of which we seem to be even now passing. Even in Germany, which has so long been the philosophic centre of Christendom, the national thought seems turned in a different direction. We have seen one of the most profound of the followers of Hegel, one of the four who formed the first class which listened to him at Jena, lecturing to a still smaller class at Berlin; and have then seen the throngs of students, which the largest lecture-room could scarcely contain, listening eagerly to the revelations of modern chemistry. If this were the first period of scepticism which the world had beheld, there might indeed be doubt whether this apparent death were not an eternal sleep.

But at present philosophy could be served in no better manner than by this enlargement of the sphere of science. Notwithstanding all that science has done, it is still a crude

mass of facts,—crude, when compared with that perfect generalization which is demanded for the purposes of philosophy. Thus must the alternations of the past be repeated in the future. But when science shall have perfectly subdued the world, then shall philosophy finally awake, and absorb its results into itself. No longer coldly reasoning, it shall be fired with Christian love; and science, philosophy, and religion shall become blended, as body, soul, and spirit, into one. Thus are scepticism as to the higher results of thought, and faith in them, fellow-workers for the perfecting of the race. These remarks may suffice with reference to Mr. Lewes's general position in regard to philosophy.

We think that it is in regard to the later German philosophies that a book like the one which we are at present considering will be most consulted. Owing to the peculiar stand-point which these occupy, it has been found difficult for the English and American reader to enter profoundly into their spirit. This difficulty increases that to which we have already referred, as inherent in all histories of philosophy. But the systems of which we speak are precisely those in regard to which Mr. Lewes's book is least worthy of confidence. The relation between the pure reason and the practical reason of Kant he has failed to bring out in its true light. He makes the practical reason depend upon the pure reason. This appears to us to be inverting the relation in which Kant left the two divisions of his subject. He showed the powerlessness of the pure reason to attain to certainty, in regard to the great questions of the Divine existence, and those which, like it, belong to the higher department of speculation. All the higher interests of the soul he would thus seem to have left undetermined. Here the practical reason comes to our aid. We have the moral law implanted in our being. We feel that, so far as our lives conform to this, they reach their true end; so far as they depart from this, they become failures and wrecks. But reverence for the moral law, and the consciousness of its importance in the attainment of the true results of living, are not sufficient to insure obedience to it. We need some other help. Without this aid we feel our souls drifting away on the tides of worldliness and

sensuality. We must have the belief in a divine lawgiver, and in the immortality of the soul; otherwise we cannot maintain our allegiance. Thus do the inmost depths of our being demand a God, as he who is drifting and struggling and drowning amid the waves cries for a deliverer. We feel that there must be a God, or that which is highest and holiest in us will perish. Speculative philosophy, if it does not affirm this, for the same reason cannot deny it. We cannot say that there is a God, but we can say that "there must be one"; and "*a must be* is stronger than an *is*."

It is in regard to Hegel, however, that the peculiarities to which we have before alluded are most distinctly marked. Mr. Lewes does not profess to understand his philosophy; that is, he continually speaks of it as if it were nonsense, which implies, of course, that it has *no sense* to him. It is easy to take the terms of any science, or detached portions of any scientific discussion, and make them appear ridiculous, or at least nonsensical, to one who has not the first principles of the science. What would be thought by such a one if he should hear, for instance, the account given in works on mathematics of the asymptote; namely, that it is a line which is continually approaching another line, which it yet could never meet, though it were prolonged to infinity? If he should open a work upon the calculus, how much would he find that would seem to him absurd! Such, for instance, would be the continual resolution of terms into infinity, which infinity he finds represented by a particular sign. Nay, even the simplest treatises on algebra would set his common sense at defiance. He would find, for instance, that two *minus* quantities multiplied together make a *plus* quantity; that is, multiply together two quantities each less than nothing and the result will be something. He would think that he had discovered the rule by which the shopkeeper made his fortune, who told his customer "that he sold so cheap that he lost on every article." "Then how do you support yourself?" was the natural question; which called forth the naïve answer, "O, by selling so much as we do!" Nay, his faith would stumble at the very starting-point. He would read $a=\lambda$, and out would come his compasses, to show that there

was considerable difference between them. Now the incredulity and common-sense objections of the person whom we have supposed opening the mathematical book for the first time, are not one whit more absurd than the criticisms and half-compassionate contempt with which Mr. Lewes treats the logic of Hegel. Of this feeling such expressions as the following may be taken as examples :—

“Such pretensions would be laughable, were they not so painful to contemplate. . . . Of the three forms of Idealism, this surely is the most preposterous; and that any sane man—not to speak of a man so eminent as Hegel—should for an instant believe in the correctness of the logic which ‘brought him to this pass,’ that he should not at once reject the premises from which such conclusions followed,—must ever remain a wonder to all sober thinkers,—must ever remain a striking illustration of the unbounded confidence in bad logic which distinguishes metaphysicians ;—

‘Gens ratione ferox, et mentem pasta chimæris,’—

truly a race mad with logic, and feeding the mind with chimeras. . . . This, it must be owned, looks like the insanity of Logic.”

One would certainly think, that, before making such assertions as these, in regard to the writings of a man whose works impress one “with a sense of his wonderful power,” he would have given a careful study to the system, and have arrived as near as possible at its meaning.

The very fact that Mr. Lewes professes to see nothing but nonsense in the works of Hegel, is, as has been said, a confession that he has not reached the sense of them. It would be very easy to show, by reference to particular passages, how far he has failed to attain to their true sense. It would be easy to show, in the same manner, how he contradicts himself in his assertions in regard to the system of which they treat. He calls one of them, for instance, in one breath, “frivolous Logic,” consisting of “verbal quibbles.” In the next, he says that it “is a work requiring prodigious effort of thought to understand”; and that, “if the student yields assent to the premises, he is sure to be dragged irresistibly to the conclusions.” But, instead of pursuing this style of criticism further, we will quote a paragraph from Mr. Lewes’s History, and will next show the basis upon which it is founded; and

the reader may thus judge of the spirit with which he approaches this part of his work. The proposition to which reference is made in the first line is what Mr. Lewes translates, "Being and Non-Being are the same"; but which we, considering the unphilosophical nature of our language, will translate, "Absolute and abstract being is nothing."

"Hegel admits the proposition to be somewhat paradoxical," he writes, "and is fully aware of its openness to ridicule; but he is not a man to be scared by a paradox, to be shaken by a sarcasm. He is aware that stupid common sense will ask, 'Whether it is the same if my house, my property, the air I breathe, this town, sun, the law, mind, or God, exist or not.' Certainly, a very pertinent question: how does he answer it? 'In such examples,' he says, 'particular ends — utility, for instance — are understood, and then it is asked, if it is indifferent to me whether these useful things exist or not? But, in truth, Philosophy is precisely the doctrine which is to free man from innumerable finite aims and ends, and to make him so indifferent to them, that it is really all the same whether such things exist or not.' Here we trace the Alexandrian influence; except that Plotinus would never have had the audacity to say that Philosophy was to make us indifferent whether God existed or not; and it must have been a slip of the pen which made Hegel include God in the examples; a slip of the pen, or else the 'rigor of his pitiless logic,' of which his disciples talk. 'Pitiless' indeed! — more intrepid absurdity it would be difficult to find. Remark, also, the evasive nature of his reply. Common sense suggests to him a plain, direct question, not without interest. This question, plain as it is, goes to the bottom of his system. He evades it by answering, that Philosophy has nothing to do with the interests of men. Very true; his system *has* nothing to do with them. But the question put was not, 'Has Philosophy to concern itself with the interests of mankind?' The question put was, 'If, as you say, Being and Non-Being are the same, is it the same thing to have a house and not to have it?' Hegel might have given a better answer, even upon his own principles." — pp. 728, 729.

The reader will be somewhat surprised to find how entirely misrepresented are the words of Hegel upon which this charge of stupid absurdity is made. Hegel does not say that in these examples particular ends, &c. are understood. He says simply, "in *some* of them," thus excluding the rest. His

expression is, *In solchen Beispieler werden zum Theil*, etc.* A few lines below, he introduces the serious and general reply to the objection, which Mr. Lewes demands, by the particles *aber überhaupt*, "but to speak generally." We will not accuse Mr. Lewes of intentionally misrepresenting the words of the author whom he is considering; we will not charge him with that ignorance of the German language, by which he failed to understand the meaning of the phrases which we have quoted. All that we say is, that he must have glanced hastily at the first part of the paragraph, and have left the last part of it unread. This is the care which he bestows upon the explanation of what he calls "the first proposition in Logic." We think the reader will not be in doubt whether the philosopher or the critic, making himself merry over his own blunders, best deserves the title of "frivolous."

Besides general misapprehensions, there is one other intimation that Mr. Lewes has never carefully read the work which he is holding up to contempt. In a note (p. 723) he says: "This play upon words is assisted by the German *aufheben*, which means 'to suppress,' as well as 'to preserve.' See *Ott, Hegel et la Philos. Allemande*." Had Mr. Lewes read Hegel's own exposition of his doctrines, he would have found this double meaning of the word brought forward and insisted upon, as an example of the tendency of the German language to look upon all things from the stand-point of the reason; and he would thus have needed no reference to outside authority. It cannot certainly be required, that, in preparing a work like the History of Philosophy, a writer should necessarily consult the original writings of all the authors referred to. He may often use the labors of others, so far as they have made the works of any one writer a particular study, and seem to have arrived at his true meaning. He may sometimes take their results as perhaps more to be relied upon than any at which he would be likely to arrive by independent research. Thus Schlegel can hardly be supposed to have read all the plays to which he refers in

* Vid. Hegel's Enc., Erster Theil, *Die Logik*, (Berlin, 1840,) p. 172.

his work upon Dramatic Literature. Thus the naturalist is forced to rely in part upon the observations of others. Without such permission as this, no general survey of any department of thought could be possible ; and certainly none of all departments. In regard to the early Grecian philosophy, there is no other method of reaching the facts. But when a man undertakes to ridicule a work, and to affirm that it is simply nonsense, we have a right to demand that he have some first-hand acquaintance with it ; or else that he state distinctly that he has no such acquaintance. Mr. Lewes intimates in his Preface precisely the opposite of this, namely, that his views are drawn from the original works of which he speaks.

In what has been said we do not wish to be understood as affirming that Mr. Lewes's work is entirely unworthy of confidence or respect. In questions relating merely to English metaphysics, he shows considerable subtilty as a reasoner ; he has collected much that is interesting in regard to the Greek philosophers ; his biographies in general are well written, and the value of the work is increased by a copious index. It has been our purpose simply to show that, in regard to the later German systems of philosophy, and all questions growing out of these, he cannot be regarded as of authority.

ART. XI. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — CHANNING, *sa Vie et ses Œuvres. Avec une Preface de M. CHARLES DE RÉMUSAT.* Paris : Didier et Cie. 1857. 8vo. pp. 424.

AN unusual attention to American literature and American authors has been given of late in the reviews and journals of France. Almost every issue of the *Révue des Deux Mondes* contains some criticism or notice of what is done on this side of the water in historical, romantic, or poetical composition. Ampère's luxurious volumes of travel have acquainted the Parisian aristocracy with the best side of American life and manners, while the sharp analysis of such writers as Isambert,